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Terry v. Ohio and the (Un)Forgettable Frisk
Seth W. Stoughton*
When I was first asked to participate in this symposium reflecting on the 
fiftieth anniversary of Terry v. Ohio,1 I had trouble identifying how I could 
contribute.  Legal scholars, after all, have criticized Terry for almost the entire 
half-centur 2
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.  I am thankful for 
the thoughtful suggestions provided by Jennifer Laurin.  I very much appreciate the help of Sarah 
Tate Chambers and the editorial assistance provided by Vanessa McQuinn and members of the Ohio 
State Journal of Criminal Law.  As always, I am deeply grateful for the support of Alisa Stoughton.
1 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 There are many more criticisms than should ever be included in a single footnote; here, I 
have provided a smattering of examples.  See Timothy C. MacDonnell, The Rhetoric of the Fourth 
Amendment: Toward a More Persuasive Fourth Amendment, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1869, 1959 
(2016) (arguing that since Terry, reasonable suspicion has increasingly favored law enforcement 
interests); Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 85 86 (2016) (arguing that 
Terry v. Ohio
Chavis Simmons, The Legacy of Stop and Frisk: Addressing the Vestiges of a Violent Police Culture,
49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849 (2014); David Abrams, The Law and Economics of Stop-and-Frisk, 46 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. -and-frisk litigation, scholars and 
lawmakers have scrutinized and attempted to resolve problems with stop-and-
M. Haines, Comment, Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: The Rights of Arab Detainees in a Post-
September 11 World, 57 ARK. L. REV. 105, 117 18 (2004) (stating that the probable cause standard 
began to change with Terry); Margaret Anne Hoehl, Casenote, Usual Suspects Beware: “Walk, Don’t 
Run” Through Dangerous Neighborhoods, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 111, 112 (2001) (stating that Terry
Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 541 (2001) (using Terry to argue that remedies for police misconduct should be 
sought outside of the Constitution); Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism 
About Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 177 Terry v. Ohio, however, may be the 
environment broadly supportive of the street-
Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 
(1999) (arguing that Terry set the foundation for a Fourth Amendment analysis that refused to 
acknowledge race and the harm cannot be undone until race is directly acknowledged); David A. 
Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 22 32 (1994); Paul 
Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1389, 1419 (1993) (arguing that courts should not look to Terry v. Ohio when evaluating the 
reasonableness of a search for narcotics without a warrant); Jodi Sax, Casenote, Drug Courier 
Profiles, Airport Stops and the Inherent Unreasonableness of the Reasonable Suspicion Standard 
After United States v. Sokolow, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 321, 327 (1991) (arguing that later courts have 
expanded the scope and relaxed the requirements of Terry M. 
Tocci, Casenote, New Application of Terry Stop and Frisk Standard—Commonwealth v. Cortez, 59 
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already been said, often with far more eloquence than I could hope to muster?  
With some misgivings, I turned for inspiration to a topic that I am typically 
reluctant to emphasize in my scholarship: my own experiences serving as a police 
officer at a large municipal police department.3 As I considered the role Terry has 
played over the last fifty years, I realized that perhaps my most significant 
nducted.
introduced to the world of stops and fr
4 I remember my first 
consensual encounter, including the search the individual consented to.  I 
remember my first foot pursuit, and the first time I used force.  I remember my first 
arrest.  I even remember the first time I made arrests for specific crimes: 
trespassing, possession of drug paraphernalia, disorderly conduct, DUI, and so on.  
any of 
the frisks I conducted.
That point bears repeating.  I served as a uniformed municipal police officer 
for some five years,5 and I was relatively active in that time.  I made hundreds of 
arrests and many more traffic stops.  I assisted other officers on their arrests and 
traffic stops on thousands of occasions.  And while most were so unremarkable 
TEMP. L.Q. 695, 695 (1986) (stating that a Pennsylvania court deviated from a narrow interpretation 
of Terry and predicting a new era of deference to the subjective judgment of police officers); Neil 
Ackerman, Comment, Considering the Two-Tier Model of the Fourth Amendment, 31 AM. U. L. REV.
Terry v. Ohio, the Court refused to dispense with the fundamental 
requirement of prob
3 I served as a uniformed patrol officer with the Tallahassee Police Department, which at the 
time employed some 320 sworn officers to serve a population of more than 150,000 people.  Today, 
my old agency employs more than 400 sworn officers and serves a population of 188,000.  Those 
metrics put it in the top two percent of largest police agencies in terms of number of sworn officers 
and in the top three percent in terms of population served.  See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICES (2015).
While my perspective is certainly shaped by my time as an officer, I am customarily reticent to 
make my own experiences a significant aspect of my scholarship.  My reluctance stems from a desire 
to avoid over-generalizing, especially because I originally joined the force with no idea that I would 
ever pursue an academic career.  At the time, I viewed my service as an officer from the perspective 
through a more academic lens.
4 My wife may disagree with me on this point, but I would characterize her disbelief as 
strategic and rhetorical rather than contextually sincere.
5 I served as a full-time officer for just under five years and as a part-time reservist for 
another six months.
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that I have no particular recollection of them, there are dozens and dozens of 
any stories about stops and frisks.  I know I stopped people.  I know I frisked 
people.  I know I did it quite frequently so frequently, in fact, that my memories 
of how I conducted frisks are fairly extensive but I have no specific memories of 
any single frisk. However many there were, those incidents were the background 
noise of my professional life, the elevator music of my law enforcement career.  I 
remember them in the same way that I remember my commute; I can tell you the 
ecall any details of any particular trip.  Those 
frisks and there were almost certainly hundreds of them were without 
exception so utterly unremarkable as to be entirely forgettable.  At least to me they 
were.  I wonder now, as we mark Terry ersary, whether those stops 
and frisks were as forgettable to the individuals on the receiving end.  I rather 
doubt it.
This essay is intentionally limited.  I set up, but do not here engage in, a more 
robust discussion of Terry of not just a particular set of 
police tactics stops and frisks but of a particular approach to policing itself.6 I
do so through the frame of my own experiences with Terry, describing in some 
detail the stops and frisks that I conducted as an officer.  By doing so, I hope to 
provide a useful touchstone; robust descriptions of frisks are surprisingly lacking 
in both academic literature and judicial opinions.  There are exceptions, of course, 
but those exceptions tend to focus on what are easily categorized as abusive 
practices.7 Here, my goal is to describe what was, to me, an entirely routine 
encounter, untainted by questionable legality,8 verbal cruelty, or physical injury.  It 
bears emphasizing that in describing my own experiences making Terry stops and
conducting frisks, I do not mean to suggest that the tactics and techniques I used 
are universal or necessarily representative of standard police practices.  Nor do I 
downplay or ignore the very real abuses that can occur.  Abuses are troubling and 
deserve to be addressed, but my focus here is on illustrating the nature of at least 
some stops and frisks that do not constitute misconduct.  Indeed, I hope to 
illustrate how the casual exercise of coercive authority may be an issue of concern 
even absent abuse.
As the Court itself described in Terry
9
6 For more on the principles that underlie modern policing, see Seth W. Stoughton, 
Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 611 (2016).
7 See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 2.
8 I thank Jennifer Laurin for pointing out, with remarkable delicacy, the limited value of my 
assessment that the routine Terry stops I initiated and the frisks that I conducted were legally sound.  
It may be more accurate to say that my description in this essay is of stops and frisks that I believed to 
be and continue to believe were untainted by questionable legality.  I acknowledge, however, that 
some of the features of the encounters that I describe herein raise questions about whether my 
confidence is well-placed.
9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 17 (1968).
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security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating 
10 Most readers, I expect, will find that description confirmed by my 
account of the frisks that I used to regularly engage in.  At the time, however, I did 
not.  Although the circumstances that justified a frisk having reasonable 
suspicion that an individual who had been lawfully stopped was armed and 
dangerous11 were concerning, the frisk itself was an entirely unremarkable aspect 
of my job.  For me, it was a threshold event in the greater context of an 
investigative detention, a relatively minor facet of the real focus of the interaction.  
If I may be permitted a broad over-generalization, let it be this: however they are 
conducted, stops and frisks are a rather routine exercise for most officers.
Individuals subjected to a stop or frisk may have a very different perspective.
The differences are perhaps least noticeable in the context of stops that do not 
involve frisks.  I was trained to initiate stops using the same approach that I would 
use to initiate consensual encounters, at least whenever the circumstances allowed 
for it.  Contrary to the way they are often portrayed which is, to be sure, based on 
at least some actual accounts I never initiated a stop by jumping out of my squad
car and shoving someone up against a wall.  Instead, I sought to approach people 
in a non-confrontational way: walking up from the side or behind someone when I 
could, for example, and never stepping in front of someone who was walking.  
Verbally, good-humored requests were, for me and most of the other officers I 
worked with, a far more common method of initiating an investigative detention 
than shouted commands.  My go-
hat the individual I was approaching was not 
free to leave and that I would take steps to stop them from leaving, if necessary, 
the shadow of the law:12 I had learned that
were being seized there was a good chance that the interaction would be legally 
considered to be consensual rather than a seizure.13 That served as something of a 
security blanket, preserving the legality of the encounter in the off chance that a 
Terry
stop.  In part, it was simply a safer and more effective way to approach people.  I 
had both learned from older officers and seen firsthand the value of convincing 
10 Id. at 24 25.
11 Id. at 30.
12 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
13 This description is not entirely accurate from a doctrinal perspective, of course.  The proper 
standard is objective, not subjective; an individual is seized when a reasonable person would not feel 
subjective perspective.  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 
194 (2002).  Looking back, the nuance of that distinction evaded me as an officer.
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people to cooperate rather than insisting on their compliance.14 As the old adage 
approach was the result of agency culture; my agency prided itself on its 
commitment to professionalism and police/community relations, which meant 
treating people as well as the circumstances allowed.
Perhaps the memories of the individuals whom I stopped, or whom I would 
have stopped if they had not cooperated, are as elusive as mine.  Perhaps they 
remember something like a casual conversation, albeit one in which a uniformed 
officer requested some form of identification and called in a criminal background 
ber 
that.
constitutionally permissible when an officer both has initiated a lawful stop and 
has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person they have stopped is armed and 
dangerous.15 Reasonable suspicion, of course, requires more than an inarticulable 
individual was armed and dangerous.16 I cannot tell you today 
why I concluded at the time that I had the requisite quantum of proof to frisk 
someone.  On some occasions, it would have been because of a specific 
waistband or peculiarities in their 
behavior.17 On other occasions, it would have been because of my experiences 
with or knowledge of the specific suspect; an individual known to carry a weapon, 
for example, or someone with a history of violence against the police.  Sometimes 
the frisk would have been based primarily or exclusively on the nature of the 
underlying offense that I had stopped the individual to investigate, as with a drug 
14 For a more lengthy discussion of the distinction between demanding compliance and 
earning cooperation, and the way those two approaches can affect police encounters, see Brandon 
Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211 (2017) (discussing 
conflict avoidance); Stoughton, supra note 6, at 652 58.
15 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
16 Id. at 21 22.
17 le
suspicion, although there is a tendency for officers to cite multiple indicators of nervousness.  For 
not just as indicia of nervousness, but as factors that separately contribute to the reasonable suspicion 
determination.  This has not gone completely unobserved by courts.  See, e.g., State v. Moore, 781 
suspicion, we, like many appellate courts, have become weary with the many creative ways law 
enforcement attempts to parlay the single element of nervousness into a myriad of factors supporting 
tendency to describe a range of 
apparently innocuous behaviors as suspicious.  See, e.g., United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 
will be described by
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offense or crime of violence.18 In any case, there were a series of relevant factors 
that I could have articulated: the time of day, characteristics of the place where the 
interaction occurred, my physical stature as opposed to that of the suspect, and so 
on.19 My training had included the frequent admonition to pay attention to what 
-
recognize at an unconscious level when things were out of place.20 When we 
learned about the many factors that could be cited to articulate reasonable 
suspicion, they were presented in the context of making us consciously aware of 
the unconscious factors that made our Spidey-Senses tingle.  Looking back, it may 
be true that those factors were, in some cases, simply ex post rationalizations, 
logical cover for implicit associations or heuristics that I was not conscious of at 
the time.
Regardless of how exactly I would have articulated reasonable suspicion, I 
believed I might have been interacting with someone who was armed and 
dangerous.  That left me highly motivated to ensure that I confirmed or dispelled 
that suspicion as early into the encounter as possible doing otherwise gave the 
suspect more opportunity to access a weapon and attack and with as much 
certainty as I could.  After patting someone down, I wanted to be as confident as I 
could be that either they were not, in fact, armed or that I had recovered all the 
weapons they were carrying.
Frisking someone takes time and attention, both of which provide the suspect 
with the opportunity to resist.  I was at least as inte
attacked in the middle of a frisk as I was in the outcome of the frisk.  Officers are 
trained to be hypervigilant for potential threats, and I had been taught that suspects 
almost always have a number of advantages: they ar -of-
force policies or constitutional restrictions, for example, and they can shift from 
calm to violent in the blink of an eye, which meant that they could act before I had 
the opportunity to react.21 I was trained to approach each encounter with an eye 
18 See Harris, supra note 2, at 22 32 (discussing decisions indicating that, in certain 
situations, reasonable suspicion to frisk is effectively automatic).
19 In identifying that it was possible, in any given case, for me to articulate some number of 
factors justifying the stop, I do not mean to suggest that those factors actually applied the way I 
thought they did at the time.  It seems likely that, on some number of occasions, my actions were 
based on misperceptions that I did not recognize as such.  Similarly, I imagine that I engaged in 
, 781 S.E.2d 897, 902 (S.C. 2016), though I would not have 
identified that as a problem at the time. 
20 The superhero Spider-Man possesses an enhanced awareness of his immediate 
surroundings that manifests as an acute tingling when he is in danger.
21 In 
Dave Grossi, The Reactionary Gap: Reminders on Threats and 
Distances, POLICEONE.COM (June 3, 2013), https://www.policeone.com/police-trainers/articles/
6258834-The-reactionary-gap-Reminders-on-threats-and-distances/ [https://perma.cc/KS92-ZECC].
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Terry frisk, starting even before officers initiate the stop itself.  Officers can 
exercise some control by not initiating the stop until they can perform the frisk at 
or close to the outset of the encounter.  Officers may, for example, surveil the 
suspect for some period of time and initiate the stop in a location that provides 
some tactical benefit, perhaps by separating the suspect from people who might 
come to his aid or limiting the directions from which the officer can be attacked by 
positioning the encounter next to a building.  Another common tactic involves 
waiting for back-up before initiating the stop.  With multiple officers present, one 
threats.23
More directly, I would
physically controlling their movement.  Again, contradicting what some portrayals 
suggest, I never had anyone lean forward with their palms up against a wall.24
Instead, depending on the situation and the su
would have the suspect put the back of their hands together behind their back, 
palms facing out in a handcuffing position.  Sometimes I would place the suspect 
into handcuffs during the frisk,25 although more frequently I would grip both of the 
22 That framing of officers mitigating their disadvantages rather than obtaining an 
advantage is intentional.  Officers learn that to assume that they have an advantage in any given 
encounter is to be complacent, and complacency can be fatal.  See, e.g., Dave Smith, If Complacency 
Is the Symptom, What Is the Disease, OFFICER.COM (Sept. 9, 2013), http://ww.officer.com/article
/11143735/if-complacency-is-the-symptom-what-is-the-disease [https://perma.cc/KR2K-RKRB].
23 STEVEN ALBRECHT & JOHN MORRISON, CONTACT & COVER: TWO-OFFICER SUSPECT 
CONTROL (1992) (discussing the role of the cover officer); Contact & Cover, LAWOFFICER.COM (Oct. 
1, 2009), http://lawofficer.com/archive/contact-cover/ [https://perma.cc/VJ7Q-2FGH].
24 I had been trained that positioning a suspect that way can actually increase the risk of the 
interaction, as it allows them to use the wall to brace themselves, potentially frustrating attempts to 
take them to the ground should it become necessary.
25 Courts have recognized that officers may, on at least some occasions, place an individual 
into handcuffs in the course of a Terry
expansion of Terry
worse, the trend has led to the permitting of the use of handcuffs, the placing of suspects in police 
cruisers, the drawing of weapons and other measures of force more traditionally associated with 
United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224 25 (7th Cir. 
1994) (quoting United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir. 1993)).  At the same time, 
courts have sometimes emphasized that handcuffs should not be viewed as inherently authorized 
whenever officers engage in Terry stops.  See Ramos v. City of Chicago, 716 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th 
Terry
ever-increasing wait times in police vehicles is disturbing, and we would caution law enforcement 
officers that the acceptability of handcuffs in some cases does not signal that the restraint is not a 
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were obese or otherwise physically struggled to put their hands behind their backs, 
I would have the suspect interlace their fingers and put their hands on the back of 
balance.  Sometimes I would have the suspect bend forward far forward over 
the hood or trunk of a car.  Other times, I would have them lean slightly, either 
backward or forward, depending on which part of their body I was frisking at the 
time.  Often, I would have one of my legs touching or very close one of the 
so stood in a way that maintained my 
backward slightly in a way that forced them to rely on me for stability.
mfortable.  
They are not intended to be, although they are not specifically designed to be 
was limiting their ability to reach for a weapon.  Ideally, I would have been able to
prevent them from pulling their hands free, although my hold was more of a 
psychological deterrent and physical hindrance than it was an insurmountable 
and arms, I could detect any physical tensing that signaled an effort to pull away, 
which would have given me some advance warning.  In the same vein, I used the 
weight that might indicate im
I precluded some methods of resistance -
balance, for example and I increased the amount of time I had to identify and 
pect would need to straighten off the car or 
regain their balance before running or turning on me.  Regardless of which variant 
I used, my goal was to ensure that I discouraged resistance and had as much 
warning of impending resistance as possible.26
Only after establishing our respective positions would I begin to frisk the 
safety.  Before beginning the frisk, I would typically ask suspects whether they had 
anything sharp on them to avoid accidental punctures as I patted someone down; I 
my standard patter prior to starting a frisk.27 Some officers wore puncture-resistant 
26 Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 14, at 253 58 (discussing time as a core tactical concept).
27 My standard patter was somet
that I need to be concerned about, right?  No weapons of mass destruction or insurgents?  Osama bin 
or from the inane 
to the relevant was quite deliberate.  I started with outlandish and impossible examples as a way to 
defuse tension by humorously making it clear to the suspect expect them to have 
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gloves, which have patches of thick fabric or flexible armor on the inside of the 
fingers and palms.  I found such gloves interfered with my ability to detect items of 
interest during the frisk, so I limited myself to donning a pair of rubber gloves
more like dishwashing gloves than surgical gloves before starting a frisk.28
And what did the frisk itself involve?  In a footnote, the Terry Court quoted 
an academic article from the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police 
Science29 with sensitive fingers every 
arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and 
30 That description is accurate, so far as 
it goes, but it does little to capture the full extent of a frisk.
Frisks are, or at least are supposed to be, about finding weapons, but weapons 
come in various shapes and sizes.  One of drills that I went through in the police 
academy involved having would-be officers pair up, with one playing the role of 
weapons or implements that could be used as weapons: folding knives, straight-
bladed knives, blades from utility razors, brass knuckles, replica guns ranging from 
full-size hand-cannons to tiny, one- or two-shot pocket pistols known as 
derringers, and so on.  Included on the table were a range of innocuous items that 
could conceivably be used as weapons: a ring of keys, an assortment of nails and 
screws, and, my personal favorite, a thin piece of metal that close inspection 
revealed to be the broken- r of eyeglasses (the arm that extends 
from the hinge on the rim to back over the ears).  The academy cadets playing the 
role of suspects would choose some number of weapons and secrete them about 
ing on what was being 
After the cadets playing the role of officers concluded that they had 
anything on them.  I used a similar technique in the context of consent searches; my thought was that 
someone was more likely to consent if I had given them a list of things they knew
em.  I would then tack on a quick question about the presence of something 
small, like drugs, to ensure that the scope of their consent was as broad as possible.
28 Rubber gloves are among the more common pieces of police equipment that almost no one 
thinks about.  I used to keep two pairs of gloves tucked between my undershirt and my bulletproof 
vest, replacing them as I used them so I always had at least one back-up pair available.  The point, as 
demonstrated by the location where I stored my gloves, was not to sanitize my touch for the benefit 
of the suspect, but to protect me from incidental contact with bodily fluids and other potential 
hazards.
29
language devoted to t Journal of Criminal 
Law, Criminology, and Police Science—1910–1960—A Brief Historical Note, 51 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 4, 4 (1960).
30 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1968) (quoting L. L. Priar & T. F. Martin, Searching 
and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 481 (1954)).
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had been missed.  Inevitably, there was a broken-off knife blade concealed in the 
cadets would be even more creative, tucking a utility razor blade flat against the 
inside of their cheek, sliding a three-inch nail hidden into a tear in the brim of a 
baseball cap, or slipping a piece of metal under a wedding band so it could be 
use the undiscovered weapons to 
creativity.
There were several lessons baked into those drills. They reiterated a 
persistent message in police training: that even the most mild-mannered suspect is 
capable of hiding a deadly weapon and turning it on the officer without warning.  
For our own survival, we learned to treat everyone as an armed threat until we 
and even then, we should 
avoid taking anything for granted.31 More specifically, the search drills established 
in our minds the need for frisks and searches to be exceptionally thorough.  That
was the only tactic to address the many creative ways people could conceal 
weapons about their bodies.32 The frisks I conducted in the field, then, were 
deliberatively invasive.  My training had taught me that they had to be; it was 
impossible to be as thorough as I believed safety required without being invasive.  
- Terry Court 
33 but in practice I did 
d slide my hand (or hands) over the area of 
that my fingertips and palms might detect any protuberance in or under the 
clench and release my 
fingers, not enough to gather the fabric of clothing or manipulate items under the 
clothing, but enough to shift clothing over the skin so I could ensure that I could 
identify items and not mistake a weapon for a seam or fold in the clothing.  I 
31 Seth W. Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s “Warrior” Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 
225, 228 n.17 (2015) (citing Richard Fairburn, Cooper’s Colors: A Simple System for Situational 
Awareness, POLICEONE.COM (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.policeone.com/police-trainers/articles/
2188253-Coopers-colors-A-simple-system-for-situational-awareness [http://perma.cc/5PU5-5957]); 
Nick Jacobellis, How to Spot a Concealed Firearm, POLICE MAG. (Nov. 1, 2007), http://www.
policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2007/11/how-to-spot-a-concealed-firearm.aspx [https://perma.
cc/RN5V-
firearm. One way to deal with this ongoing problem is to assume that every subject or individual that 
32 Jacobellis, supra
of methods to transport and conceal firearms.  Criminals have hidden guns in their crotches, in 
special pockets in their baggy jeans, in concealed compartments inside their pants, in their waistband, 
and the same way that you do in ankle holsters, shoulder holsters, belt holsters, and fanny packs.  
33 Terry, 392 U.S. at 7.
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remember focusing on feeling with the pads of my fingers rather than the tips, 
thinking that doing so would make it less likely that I would exceed the limits of a 
frisk by manipulating the clothing or items under the clothing.
After securing someone in the appropriate position, I would start by using my 
free hand to frisk the locations where weapons were most likely to be: the 
midsection and run my fingers along and beneath their belt, then frisk their 
waistband, front and back pockets, groin, and buttocks.  The groin and buttocks 
bear special mention, as it had been drilled into me in training that criminals knew 
and took advantage of the fact that officers were naturally uncomfortable searching 
these areas.  The potential for avoiding discovery made those areas particularly 
attractive as hiding spots, which in turn made it particularly important for me to 
search there.  To do so, I would make the same motio
reaching around over the front of the thighs and doing the same from the back, 
making my way across.  Inevitably, this involved contact (through gloves and 
effective frisk.  As I was trained, I sought to avoid unnecessarily discomforting 
suspects by informing them of what I was doing as or immediately before I did it.
Once I had finished frisking a suspe
Using the same sliding, gripping motion, I would run my hands around the upper 
thigh, lower thigh, knee, and calf before frisking the
it by running a hand from their forehead to the hairline on their neck, starting on 
hair long enough to hang down or collect into a ponytail, I would gently squeeze 
the entire length in my palm, again slightly clenching and releasing my fingers to 
identify foreign objects.  After frisking or, in some circumstances, skipping the 
34 I could start at top of their shirt, working my way all around the 
ng 
down to the front of the armpit, then the armpit itself moving up to the back until I 
could switch sides.  Once both shoulders and armpits had been frisked, I could 
move to the chest and back.
th the groin area, 
I informed suspects of what I would be doing in an effort to mitigate their 
discomfort and, frankly, to head off allegations of sexual impropriety.  I was taught 
34 There was, for example, no need to frisk the head of a bald suspect who was not wearing a 
hat.
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than the 
palm or inside of the fingers, and to make a point of telling them so.  The 
assumption, which I never questioned until it was derisively rejected by one of my 
of back or edge of my hand was less invasive or offensive than using my palm.  
hand down and under one breast, keeping the edge of my hand pressed firmly 
against their ribs and the back of my hand riding along their breast so I could 
detect anything that may be hidden in a shirt or bra.  After checking the perimeter 
of the breast, I would run the side of my hand over the top.  After doing that on 
to the sides.  After frisking the torso, I would move on to the arms, if they were 
covered, starting at the shoulder and moving to the edge of the sleeve.
If, during the course of a frisk, I felt something that I identified as weapon or 
contraband, my reaction depended on the situation.  With some objects, including 
anything that I perceived to be a firearm, I might immediately restrain the suspect 
further by having them get onto the ground, by putting them into handcuffs, or by 
having a second officer hold them while I retrieved the weapon (or vice versa).  
For other objects, such as folding knives, I would typically retrieve the weapon and 
secure it either by putting it in my own pocket or by handing it to another officer.  
In either case, I would continue the frisk after identifying the item and, if it was a 
35 If the item was readily identifiable as contraband, such as a 
small baggie of drugs,36 I would typically retrieve the item, place the suspect into 
handcuffs (if they were not already handcuffed), and confirm the contents by 
asking the suspect to identify them or by having another officer use a field test kit.  
If what I retrieved was an unlawful weapon or appeared to be contraband, of 
course, the suspect would be placed under arrest and I would begin an even more 
invasive search incident to arrest.
35 ROBERT S. STERING, POLICE OFFICER S HANDBOOK: AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 90 (2005) 
-
you should assume that the suspect has two weapons.  If two weapons are found, you should assume 
36 Although it is outside the scope of this essay, it is worth noting that officers may also 
receive training in how to identify contraband during frisks.  A training document provided by the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, for example, suggests that officers may be able to 
establish their recognition of drugs by testifying that they have practiced frisking officers who have 
baggies of drugs in their pockets.  STEVEN L. ARGIRIOU, TERRY FRISK UPDATE: THE LAW, FIELD 
EXAMPLES AND ANALYSIS, https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported_files/training/programs/
legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-by-subject/4th-amendment/terryfriskupdate.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZV7L-MRP2] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
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the cognitive or psychological mechanisms to explain my lack of memory is 
beyond my ability.  But Moshe Bar, director of the Cognitive Neuroscience 
Laboratory at Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts General Hospital, 
suggested in an easily digestible op-ed that human memory does not record 
mundane events precisely because they are mundane.37 Perhaps my frisks were 
etch the day into memory; not much had happened that had not happened 
38
But that just begs the question: why were the frisks I performed so mundane 
as to be forgettable?  Several answers present themselves.  It was, of course, 
entirely routine to take actions intended to ensure officer safety to the highest 
extent possible.  For more than 50 years, criminologists have identified a 
preoccupation with danger as one of the defining characteristics of policing.39 In 
other work, I have described the training and messaging that reinforces that 
approach, as well as the type of tactical thinking and actions that it incentivizes.40
In that vein, frisks are just one of many different tools that I used on a daily basis 
to engage in a routine, if important, part of my job.
Frisks were not just one component of a broader focus on officer safety on a 
macro level, they were also, in my mind, a relatively minor facet of each encounter 
on a micro level.  As best as I can recall, my frisks did not turn up weapons or 
contraband in most cases, which meant that, after the frisk, I was still in the 
position of confirming or dispelling the suspicions that gave rise to the underling 
Terry stop.  After all, the underlying stop was justified by my suspicion that the 
individual I just finished frisking had just been, was, or was about to be engaged in 
criminal activity, separate and apart from whether they were armed and dangerous.  
Frisks did not exist in their own right so much as they constituted a transient 
component of what was, to me, a totally normal interaction with a civilian. Frisks 
-
41 That is not to imply that the exercise of state power was 
illusory; to the contrary, it suggests the difficulty of observing the scope and 
contours of state power in light of how it is actually exercised.  Perhaps frisks were 
so forgettable because they were merely threshold events, pit stops on the path to 
whatever the eventual destination happened to be.
37 Moshe Bar, Opinion, Human Memory: What Did You Do Last Sunday?, L.A. TIMES (May 
29, 2011) http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/29/opinion/la-oe-bar-memory-20110529 [https://
perma.cc/5SLF-LVNJ].
38 Id.
39 JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY 42 48 (1966).
40 See, e.g., Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 14; Stoughton, supra note 6; Seth W. Stoughton, 
Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 864 69 (2014).
41 Mat Coleman & Angela Stuesse, The Disappearing State and the Quasi-Event of 
Immigration Control, 48 ANTIPODE 524, 527 (2015).
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The relative significance of the frisk vis-à-vis the stop can perhaps be 
illustrated by the way I would explain my actions at the time.  When challenged, or 
questioned by a suspect whom I had stopped, it was easy enough to explain why I 
was investigating them.  When possible, my habit and I make no claim that it 
was universal was to attempt to convince the suspect of the propriety of my 
actions by explaining why it would be professionally inappropriate to not
investigate them.  I frequently referred explicitly to the articulable factors that 
justified the Terry stop.  So, for example, I could explain to an aggrieved suspect 
that I had stopped them because it was unusual for pedestrians to be wandering in a 
non-residential area in the wee hours of the morning.  By doing so, I would attempt 
to enlist their aid protecting the community, which just so happened to require 
42
In contrast to my explanations for the stop itself, which could be an important 
part of earning the Terry frisks 
as far more superficial.  To the extent that I went beyond the generic statement, 
which our mutual safety was to be
conducting the frisk, that rather abrupt explanation could be attributed to the need 
to establish control over the situation relatively quickly; prolonged conversation 
would have extended the risk I faced interacting with someone whom I 
(reasonably) suspected of being armed and dangerous.  But even after a frisk, when 
time was no longer a relevant concern, the explanations did not get much deeper 
objective had changed.  I had conducted a frisk because the circumstances made it 
unwise not to; it was something to get out of the way as efficiently as possible so 
that I could focus on the real reason for the actual encounter in relative safety.
as an almost incidental facet of an 
interaction that was really about the investigative detention was inverse to that of 
the individuals whom I stopped.  Being questioned about their presence or activity 
itself was, for many people, the more salient component of the interaction.  The 
dichotomy in perspectives about the significance of frisks that determines whether 
they are memorable or perhaps remember-able may evidence a more broadly 
applicable, if underappreciated, structural barrier to police reform.  It is not just 
that officers and community members disagree about the propriety or effectiveness 
of various police actions, it is also true that they have very different conceptions of 
what those actions are.  If true, that observation offers some support for a thesis 
43 In the narrow 
42 I did not think in terms of procedural justice at the time; it simply made sense to convince 
someone to cooperate whenever circumstances permitted.
43 Stoughton, supra note 6, at 612.
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context of frisks, perhaps a deeper appreciation for the lived experience of being 
frisked might have changed my perspective on, or my use of, that tactic.  Even if it 
had no effect on the number of frisks I conducted, I wonder now whether that 
change in perspective would have encouraged an approach that left the civilians I 
frisked with a different impression of my actions.
I do
everyone I targeted
such extremes to recognize that an individual subjected to a frisk might not view 
that interaction the way I did: so routine as to be utterly forgettable.
